New World generated greater equality than existed in the Old World.8 O important dimension of equality in the United States, perhaps the mo important, has long been the existence of equality of opportunity. Accordin to this belief men could frequently and easily proceed from rags to rich Despite the centrality of this belief, only in the 1960s did historians try measure the extent of social mobility. The absence of similar studies other societies meant that American scholars often concluded that altho social mobility was less than once believed it must still have been "high than elsewhere. Several concluded that the "high" level of upwards mobi discovered in various communities helped contribute to the weakness class consciousness in the United States and the absence of a popular pa of the "left".9 The American studies assumed that the level of social mobilit defined the permeability of class boundaries (a central proposition in t Weberian tradition); high mobility means weak class boundaries, a redu possibility for class consciousness, and a lower likelihood of class-based itical action. These conclusions attracted considerable criticism, not le because they ran contrary to the main thrust of social history's preocc pation with collective behaviour and shared experience.10 As Clyde and S Griffen remarked, however, If there is an inherent danger that mobility studies will overemphasize the individual drive for success, there is also a corresponding danger that the interests o historians of labour or immigration in the occasions when their subjects express In the United States urban historians, having made a considerable impact, retreated. The criticisms of their assumptions, methods and conclusions, in particular those conclusions which inferred action/consciousness from structural patterns, doubtless made the tedium and labour necessary for such work seem pointless. By the early 1980s the study of social mobility was regarded (by most historians) as an intellectual dead end; it was even described as "'deep in the throes of Thermidorian reaction' against its quantitative models and methods".12 Ironically, as Grusky and Fukumoto point out, within the discipline of sociology the "subfield of mobility analysis has [...] flourished during this period [...] transformed by the development of new models, new conceptual orientations, and new theoretical perspectives". In particular, the application of log-linear modelling to studies of mobility made it possible to control for demographic and occupational change. As a result, the common criticisms of the "new" urban history and its mobility studies have been met.13
While many sociologists and historians are repelled by the complexities of log-linear modelling, a number of European historians have begun to tackle worklife and intergenerational mobility.14 Inspired by the work of
John E. Goldthorpe et al. , particularly Social Mobility and Class Structure in
Modern Britain (1990) and The Constant Flux (1992), a major comparative study of social mobility co-authored with R. Erikson, several scholars have tackled the problem of measuring past patterns and rates of social mobility.
These studies adopted Goldthorpe's "class-structural" method of conceptualizing the occupational structure and deployed sophisticated statistical methods to analyse the occupational information about historical populations contained in various historical sources, notably marriage records (which usually record the occupations of the groom and his father). Marriage records have proved attractive because they provide historians with a source akin to the national representative samples from which sociologists generate survey data but, like survey data itself, the limitations of the source ii. Clyde and Sally Griffen, Natives and Newcomers, pp. xii-xiii. 12. K.N. Conzen, "Quantification and the New Urban History", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 13 (1983) have prompted several criticisms.15 Most notably, as A.B. Sorenson poin out, marriage records suffer from the problem of any "two-point analy (i.e. a snapshot of the father's and the son's occupations on the day wh the marriage record was filled out).16 National representative samples a tend to overlook unusual or atypical groups, ignore the possible importa of local context as a dimension of the stratification order, and make difficult to disaggregate "conventional aggregate classes". "Although lo stratification is often regarded as sociologically trivial," as Grusky an Sorensen recently pointed out, "the available evidence suggests that su class analytic processes as closure, exploitation, and collective action eme more clearly at the level of disaggregate occupations than convention aggregate classes."17 No method is without problems or critics but each help reveal the processes and rates of social mobility which "bear centra on class formation, class structuration, and the potential for class action".18
Mobility, in short, is a "crucial mediating process" between structure a action.19
THE CAVERSHAM PROJECT
The Caversham project was undertaken to assess some of these issues to provide a basis of comparison with other studies.20 Caversham is a urban-industrial suburb of the country's then most industrial ci Dunedin. Although in the period studied, 1902-1928, Dunedin was beg ning to decline (relative to other cities in New Zealand), it continued grow in absolute terms (from 46,515 at the 1901 Census to an estima 84,060 by 1928). 21 During the period studied Caversham comprised roug twelve per cent of Dunedin's population and the occupational structur remained a microcosm of that for urban New Zealand as a whole. The population turned over rapidly, often moving short distances to adjacent suburbs, with almost seventy per cent of the adult population resident in the suburb for less then ten years. Inflow exceeded outflow, but both This photograph was taken of the most densely populated part of Caversham Borough just before the beginning of the period studied. As can be seen, the area was dominated by a small number of two-storied buildings, usually shops or workshops, and a lot of small cottages situated on their own plots of land. The gasworks, the railway workshops, a substantial brick works and a flourmill dominated this part of the Borough and manual workers inhabited the cottages.
Otago Settlers' Museum migration streams were random, and the occupational structure of the suburb remained remarkably stable.22 The state-owned railway workshops, several large engineering workshops and foundries, a boot-making factory, a brick works and a sanitary-pipe factory were the major employers. A high proportion worked in small-scale enterprises.23
Unfortunately, the enumerator's returns from the New Zealand census have been destroyed, forcing social historians to rely on other sources. The electoral rolls are the best available source because they recorded all members of both sexes who, having arrived at the age of twenty-one and being of sound mind etc., registered to vote in a general election. The most important limitation of the electoral rolls is that they o allow analysis of intra-generational mobility of men, now usually refe to as worklife mobility. The nature of our data means that we have in gated the mobility turnover of a suburb rather than worklife mobili traditionally understood. In other words we are not primarily analysing " mobility trajectories of individuals but rather [...] mobility rates and patt understood as societal attributes".26 Our sources allow us to establish extent to which each social class recruited from its own ranks, how o this urban-industrial society was across this prosperous period (albei characterized by high levels of industrial conflict and class mobilizati and whether it was in any respects exceptional.27 We can thus determ the degree of "demographic class formation" by analysing occupatio mobility in Caversham within a comparative perspective.
It has long been recognized by students of mobility that occupati mobility is not a surrogate for social mobility. Occupational mob ignores changes in residence, income, wealth, education and lifestyle. are the changes in occupation addressed in this paper necessarily the important changes. Occupational change did not necessarily entail a in social class although it may well have involved a rise in incom increase in autonomy, or an improved lifestyle. Besides, in large orga tions, such as the railways or a bank, substantial career mobility migh achieved without a change in class.28 Students of social mobility also recognize that not everyone wanted occupational mobility, but it is possible to make reasonable inferences from mobility patterns about the degree of class cohesion, the extent of affinity or disaffinity between classes, classrecruitment patterns, whether particular occupations or classes had distinctive attitudes, and "demographic class formation". Two constraints have controlled the precise form of occupational classification adopted. First, we wanted to ensure that whatever categories we developed for analysing occupational mobility in Caversham were comparable with those used by scholars in other societies. Second, the desire for comparability with studies of other societies had to be modified in order to ensure that the system of classification we adopted was faithful to the local evidence and allowed for disaggregation. Consequently we decided that more categories were needed than most studies have used and that we would investigate, not assume, the centrality of the divide between "white-collar" and "blue-collar" occupational classes.31 We established a separate category for small employers and the self-employed (the US Census data does not permit this distinction to be used but sociological studies usually observe it).32 As remarked earlier, Stones Directory proved indispensable in this process. This provides a degree of refinement in classification which historians elsewhere have sometimes lacked.33 It is possible, however, to aggregate our categories to match those used in the United States and, to a lesser extent, western Europe. It ought to be said, however, that "it is an empirical matter 29. For a judicious discussion see the GrifFens, Natives and Newcomers , ch. 2, and Mike Savage, "Social Mobility and Class Analysis", pp. 69-79. 30. Thernstrom, Other Bostoniansy p. 46. There is a large sociological literature which confirms this point although some evidence suggests that the smallness of New Zealand society has made complexity more central; see Pitt (ed.), Social Class in New Zealandy and more especially Pearson and Thorns, Eclipse of Equality , pp. 244-247, which analyses "small-town capitalism" and its social relations.
31. Nine categories were used (as against Thernstrom s five). David G. Pearson and David C.
Thorns, Eclipse of Equalityy p. 231, summarized several studies which used "white-collar" and "manual" as a critical divide by concluding that while "the inheritability of a blue or white collar is [. to see how many social classes are actually formed in any society8. On object of this study is to determine the degree to which the structural economic) classes were self-contained and separate from the others, as measured by traffic between each pair, or (in other words) the degree to wh these structural classes were also social classes.34
The class categories used will be broadly familiar to students of mobil (a broad Marxist schema based on relationship to the means of product with Weberian labour market criteria to introduce more refined distinctions).35 The classes are as follows:
(1) large employers and higher managerial; (2) professionals; (3) semiprofessionals; (4) small employers and self-employed, sometimes referred to as petty proprietors; (5) officials and supervisory; (6) "white-collar8; (7) skilled; (8) semiskilled; and (9) unskilled.
Two further categories were added to accommodate those who had no occupation, married women and retired men, but these categories are irrelevant to this study of male social mobility.
Within the nine structural classes we started by assuming that a threefold hierarchical division existed, based on prestige or general desirability. Large employers/higher managerial, professionals and semiprofessionals enjoyed the highest status positions in the occupational structure; "white-collar8, officials and supervisory people occupied the middle ranges; and the manual workers occupied the lower status levels. The self-employed and smal 35. The justification for this approach is spelt out in Olssen and Hickey, Towards an Occupational Classification", pp. 1-12 and the problems involved in applying this scheme to the data are discussed in the rest of that working paper. J.H. Goldthorpe's Introduction to Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain , (Oxford, 1986) , provides an excellent overview of the literature relating to social class. Although Goldthorpe's pragmatic approach to class -which he defines as an issue to be empirically investigated -has been attacked, we feel that the attack has been unsuccessful, as do others; see Richard Breen and David Rottman, "Class Analysis and Class occupational prestige, however, no assumption can be made about a hierarchy of power, property or wealth although members of the "elite" classes would usually have possessed more of each than anyone in the manual working classes.38 In this paper, in short, mobility is largely conceptualized within a nine-class structure although the nine classes can be grouped in a threefold social hierarchy -upper non-manual, middle (including small employers and the self-employed), and manual working classes. skilled and even more vigorously from white-collar, reflecting the ease of movement between some metal trades and some branches of engineering and the fact that it was still quite common for accountants to be recruited from the ranks of book-keepers and clerks. It is clear, however, that it became harder for manual workers to enter the higher non-manual classes and less likely for higher non-manual men to become manual workers. The self-employed/small employers also became much more closed in the second period, eighty-seven per cent of their number in 1919 having been in the same class in 1911 (compared with seventy-two per cent in the previous period). Skilled and unskilled became much less likely to break into the non-manual classes. In 1911-1919 the white-collar class was slightly more likely to have recruited from elsewhere but the size of the increase was scarcely significant. By and large the war period 1914-1919 does not seem to have impacted upon recruitment in the way that it did on class retention.
A comparison of inflow/outflow rates for professionals over the two periods suggests that entry became more difficult over time. The increased emphasis on formal educational qualifications for the professions may explain this pattern. We need to be cautious, however, because the professionals, compared to other classes, continued to recruit quite eclectically largely, it seems, because of: (1) the weak barriers to movement between some branches of the metal trades and certain branches of engineering, and (2) the ease with which accountants could become higher managers (still a marked feature of New Zealand society). The exceptions help to prove the rule, however, for several "proto-professions" organized themselves in the period -dentists in 1904 and accountants in 1908, for instance -with the intention of achieving the professional status of doctors and lawyers. Sometimes these organizations required new entrants to have studied at university but often they organized their own examinations. Sometimes the two systems coexisted. A mania for state registration infected many occupations during this period, including plumbers and electricians (although those occupations did not aspire to professional status). The increased importance of school examinations in credentialling has been noted by several historians of education.41
Analysis of the period 1919-1928 indicates that the trend towards closure did not continue (Table iĒ6 gives the outflow percentages and Table 1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N upwards mobility exceeded a almost doubled the rate for th on the three-class model. Do the trend towards increased downwards mobility was rough class models. Outflow and in and the proportion occupatio sometimes very sharply. On eighty-five per cent, remain periods no movement occurr structure, higher non-manu considerable movement took place.42 Manual workers, in particular, enjoy considerable opportunities for mobility into other classes. Although ma skidded into the ranks of the unskilled many more moved upwards. T flow into the small employers/self-employed and white-collar was especially marked.
So far we have analysed absolute mobility rates. Absolute rates refer the proportion of individuals who move, or do not move, from a class Absolute rates, however, ignore changes in the size of the population an the shape of the occupational structure. Analysis of relative rates allo control for such changes. The relative mobility rate, in brief, indicates t relative probability that an individual will remain in the same class or m into a different class once the impact of demographic and occupationa change has been removed. Relative mobility, defined statistically, is "th part of total mobility which is apparent after changes in the marginal distr butions of tables have been filtered out".43 The marginal distributions o mobility table express changes in the occupational structure and alteratio in the demographic regime, whether caused by changing patterns migration or shifts in the fertility rate. Where the margins of the mobility table are not equal, some mobility will simply reflect the fact that chan have occurred in the occupational structure or the shape of the populati Log-linear modelling is a standard technique used to distinguish betwe absolute and relative mobility. 44 There is a vast array of log-linear models available to the researcher interested in social mobility, but we use log-linear modelling only to test if t patterns apparent from the analysis of absolute mobility are also reflect in the relative rates. The analysis makes use of two simple log-linear models, 54. If mobility chances were age-specific, as some studies have concluded, then part of the increased rigidity would reflect that impact of the 147 men in our sample who were residents of
Caversham throughout the period 1902-1928, and that a large number of young men were removed for the war. Even were this the case -i.e. that mobility chances reflected age -the impact of increased rigidity remained. 55. In the more industrial areas the Labour Party polled most strongly; for a fuller discussion see While detailed analysis complicates the initial finding, the suspicio remains that government policies had an impact on mobility levels and voters may well have chosen their party on the basis, at least in part, of it record on issues perceived as relevant to mobility prospects. The increas overall mobility which began in 1919-1922 and accelerated in 1922-19 making the third decade in this study the most open, whether in abso or relative terms, confirms this conclusion. Labour's proportion of the dropped locally in 1922 and the party failed to regain the lost groun either 1925 or 1928. If mobility bears centrally on class formation, c structuration, and the potential for class action, as several scholars h concluded, then the high rates of worklife mobility in 1919-1928, and return to a pattern where upwards movement substantially exceeded do wards movement, may have helped blunt Labour's advance. Not only Labour fail to increase its share of the vote but the union movement l ground both in membership and bargaining power. This account captures only part of the story, however, for Caversham and Dunedin did not enjoy economic growth in the postwar period and the government's main policies for increasing opportunity would not have been particularly apparent to the voters in our database. Land and loans for soldiers to set themselves up as farmers or small proprietors, while important nationally, had little impact within Caversham. Reform's parallel policy of making credit easily available to prospective home-owners might have had an impact locally but our database cannot address the question of home ownership. Home ownership, however, is not unimportant as a dimension of the opportunity structure.57
CAVERSHAM'S MOBILITY RATES IN INTERNATIONAL

CONTEXT
Such an analysis immediately raises the issue discussed "high" rate or a "low" rate? The question cannot be answe rates in the abstract. It is instructive to compare mobi with mobility in other cities and towns, however, as low indicate social closure which in turn suggests demograph and the potential for the recognition of shared political inte an important factor in politics. Most comparable studies centrality of the divide between non-manual and ma sometimes known as "white-collar" and "blue-collar", whi versal preference for non-manual work and ignores the poss of small employers/self-employed.58 Although neither assum for Caversham it is simple enough to reorganize the Cav comparable categories in order to compare Caversham's m the rates reported for other cities and towns.59 Althoug considerably in size, growth rates, and economic funct conclusion that "the post-1850 Boston pattern was manife of other cities" emphasizes the value of the comparison; 68. Ibid, y Table 4 .5, p. 57 and for his classification of occupations pp. 289-302. We disaggregated his "low white-collar", which includes "petty proprietors, managers and officials", but otherwise ignored the handful of instances where we had classified small occupations differently. The absence of data on age for the Caversham men reduces the reliability of the comparison. Thernstrom's data, taken from census enumerators' books, allowed a subsequent analysis of the ages of his sample whereas the Caversham men were between twenty-one years old and retirement or death. Assuming that men became less likely to be upwardly mobile as they moved into their forties, then it is possible that the differences in the class persistence rates between Boston and Caversham are much smaller than the figures in Table 1 .9 indicate. This is especially the case where the difference was less than twenty per cent. The difference in the class persistence rates for the unskilled is so large, however, that it is very unlikely that it would disappear even if we had age data for the Caversham men. indicates that the different rates are not a function of different age structures. Our subsample, while too small to warrant extensive analysis, does tend to show that for each of the three time periods the mobile members of our age subsample are on average younger than the immobile members. The difference is most dramatic in 1902-1911 when mobile individuals had an average age of twenty-seven years and immobile individuals had an average age of thirty-eight years. In the later periods the difference is smaller, the average ages for 1911-1919 being thirty-one and thirty-seven, and for 1919-1928, thirty-five and forty. in Caversham had no idea that they were disadvantaged compared unskilled Bostonians, or that they would have cared had they known, an they may well have been entirely happy with the level of opportunity available. This well-known slippage between structure and the meanings assign to structure by the historical actors, the gist of the hermeneutic critiqu does not invalidate structural analyses.77 Structural change can only be u in defining one aspect of a more complex social-cultural world and its meaning must be identified through contemporary perceptions. Those pe ceptions bore the imprint of the hopes and desires of British artisans a developed in the 1890s to emphasize mutual aid, local autonomy, appre tice-based crafts and control of the job. Armed with this strong sense of the worker's just entitlements, Caversham's workingmen increasingly resort to political action and built both strong unions and a powerful politica movement.78 As the Griffens noted, however, "the individual drive for success" should not be considered incompatible with "occasions [...] [of] so darity".79 There is plenty of evidence that individualistic and collectivis attitudes and habits coexisted among Caversham's workers. The desire f social mobility, or merely a belief that opportunities ought to be availab did not preclude a willingness to support collectivist strategies any mo than casting a vote for a Labour candidate, or even striking, precluded desire to improve one's personal position. Becoming self-employed or a small master was still normal in Caversham. Egalitarianism, the domina cultural pattern, accommodated the tension between individuality and so darity, defining the socially acceptable forms for the pursuit of individu goals.80
Given the coexistence of individual and collective strategies and aspirations it must be considered significant that the congealing class structure at the lower reaches was so closed at roughly the period when industrial conflict reached unprecedented levels (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) ) and a Labour Party preaching revolutionary socialism established itself securely in urban areas (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) . These national developments were echoed in Caversham and Dunedin, the local unions becoming increasingly class-conscious, especially from 1913 onwards, while the once-aloof Dunedin Labour party moved far enough "left" to affiliate to the New Zealand Labour Party on its formation in 1916 while retaining the loyalty of supporters. The Reform government's hostility to the militant unions may have given local workers even stronger reasons for voting Labour, although they disapproved of most militant tactics. It seems just as likely that their perception of Reform as hostile to workingmen reflected their sense that it had become harder for workingmen to enter non-manual jobs. One did not have to desire upwards mobility for oneself to resent the increased difficulty, the discrimination against members of one's own class, and the tendency of the rich to flaunt their power and wealth.
Socialist and Labour political rhetoric of the period is steeped in such resentments. The desire to nationalize all productive land and all large industries reflected not only a social-democratic critique of private property but an older fear that private wealth, unchecked, caused opportunities for others to shrink. Nor is it irrelevant to note that the growing use of collectivist strategies in the period 1908-1920 alienated petty proprietors and whitecollar workers, despite their eclectic recruitment patterns. They now moved to define themselves culturally and politically as apart from the "working class". The dramatic increase in opportunities for upwards mobility which occurred in the postwar decade did not alter these trends but made it harder for Labour to enlarge its constituency despite population growth. This process of differentiation, tentatively inferred from political behaviour in Building the New World, appears to be confirmed by using mobility patterns to analyse social structure.81 It is not only, as Erikson and Goldthorpe noted, that the more a social class recruits from its own ranks, and the less easy it is for its members to achieve upwards mobility, the more likely it is to be socially and culturally cohesive, and the more likely it is to engage in classbased collective action. The evidence from Caversham also suggests that voters were not unconscious of the shifting pattern of class rigidity and opportunity.
81. Olssen, Building the New World, chs 7 and 8. For political developments in New Zealand see also Gustafson, Labour's Path to Political Independence, and for the union movement, Olssen, The Red Feds.
